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Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption.  It discusses the 
cross-country differences in design, and synthesizes the policy messages from cross-
country empirical work as well as individual country experiences.  The paper develops 
practical lessons from all this work and distills the evidence into a set of principles of 
good design.  Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm 
that, for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the 
installation of a deposit-insurance system.   
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  Deposit insurance can be explicit or merely implicit.  Explicit insurance coverages 
are contractual obligations; implicit coverages are only conjectural. Implicit insurance 
exists to the extent political incentives that influence a government’s reaction to large or 
widespread banking problems make taxpayer bailouts of insolvent banks seem inevitable.  
Every country offers implicit insurance because, during banking crises, the pressure on 
government officials to rescue at least some bank stakeholders becomes difficult to resist. 
While still far from universal, explicit deposit insurance (DI) systems are multiplying 
rapidly.  The number of countries offering explicit deposit guarantees surged from 20 in 
1980 to 87 by the end of 2003 (see Figure 1). 
  One reason for this surge is that having an explicit deposit insurance scheme has 
come to be seen as one of the pillars of modern financial safety nets. Establishing explicit 
deposit insurance has become a principal feature of policy advice on financial 
architecture that outside experts give to countries undergoing reform.  Starting in the 
1990s, IMF crisis-management advice recommended erecting DI as a way of either 
containing a crisis or winding down crisis-generated blanket guarantees (Folkerts-Landau 
and Lindgren, 1998; Garcia, 1999).  The World Bank has also actively supported the 
adoption of DI and provided adjustment loans for initial capital of deposit insurance 
funds in a number of countries.
1 
  Table 1 lists countries that have adopted DI since 1995. Although many recent 
adopters were transition countries of Eastern Europe seeking to comply with the 
European Union (EU) Directive on Deposit Insurance, adopters can be found in every 
                                                 
1 A World Bank report (OED) found that, during the period 1993-2004, the World Bank concerned itself in 
a total of 60 instances with reforms in the deposit-insurance schemes of 35 countries.  
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region of the world.  Countries with and without DI at yearend 2003 are mapped in 
Figure 2. Holdouts outnumber DI adopters. Most African countries do not offer explicit 
deposit insurance, and neither does China.  In the developed world, Australia, New 
Zealand and Israel stand out as important exceptions.    
  Trends in DI adoption should not be interpreted as evidence that designing and 
operating an efficient system are straightforward tasks.  On the contrary, system personnel 
are tasked with conflicting objectives that make both jobs exceedingly difficult.  Conflict 
comes from differences in the size and distribution of costs and benefits. The central 
challenge of deposit- insurance management is to strike an optimal balance between the 
benefits of preventing crises and the costs of controlling bank and customer risk-taking.  
Protecting against crises and shocks absorbs considerable resources and can easily end up 
subsidizing bank risk-taking. When such subsidies exist, they foster imprudent banking 
practices and support inefficient borrower investments in real resources.   
  Given the difficulties policymakers face in designing and operating a  country’s 
safety net, they typically look to experts to help them decide whether to adopt explicit 
deposit-insurance and, if so, how to design a workable system. Cost-benefit analysts should 
conduct a careful review of cross-country econometric evidence and also collect and 
examine testimony from practitioners in individual countries. 
  This study adds some new data points to the evidence available to guide decisions 
about deposit-insurance adoption, design and implementation. The next section summarizes 
the dimensions of the data set and highlights cross-country differences in deposit insurance 
design.  Section 3 reviews cross-country econometric evidence on the costs and benefits of  
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deposit insurance.  Section 4 develops practical lessons from individual-country 
experiences.  Section 5 distills both kinds of evidence into a set of principles of good design.   
 
2. Deposit  Insurance  Around  the  World 
Banking crises are painful and disruptive.  During a crisis, liquidity typically dries 
up. Customers lose access to bank balances and some worthy borrowers and equity issuers 
find that financial markets cannot accommodate their need for funding.  Working-class and 
retired households may be forced into a hand-to-mouth existence. Severe crises derail 
macroeconomic stabilization programs, slow future growth, and increase poverty. Solid 
businesses may lose access to credit and be forced into bankruptcy.   Diminished confidence 
in domestic financial institutions may fuel a panicky flight of foreign and domestic capital 
that not only closes down institutions but generates a currency crisis.  
To minimize pain and disruption, policymakers erect a financial safety net.  The net 
seeks simultaneously to make crises less likely and to limit the harm suffered when 
insolvencies occur.  Implicit and explicit deposit insurance are critical components of 
national safety nets.   
Deposit-insurance guarantees appeal to policymakers for multiple reasons.  One 
reason is that their costs are less immediately visible than their benefits. In the short run, 
installing explicit deposit insurance can actually lower reported budget deficits. This is 
because accountants can book premium revenue paid by banks without fully 
acknowledging on the other side of the government’s income statement the incremental 
value of the formal obligations that DI guarantees generate.  Such one-sided accounting 
paints deposit insurance as a costless way of reducing the threat of bank runs.  More  
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lasting benefits include protecting unsophisticated depositors and improving 
opportunities for small and opaque domestic banks to compete with larger and more-
transparent domestic and foreign institutions. Also, when adopted as part of a program of 
privatization or post-crisis restructuring, cutting back the maximum size of balances 
covered by government guarantees becomes an important goal. Explicit deposit insurance 
can formally curtail the size of guarantees previously conveyed to banks that were 
government-owned or granted emergency blanket coverage.  
To document differences in deposit-insurance systems, the authors assembled a 
cross-country and time-series database covering 181 countries. This database provides 
comprehensive information on the existence and timing of deposit-insurance adoption, 
design features installed, and any changes in features made over time (see Demirguc-
Kunt, Kane, Karacaovali, and Laeven, 2006).
2   
Table 2 shows that 75 percent of high-income countries offer DI, but only 16 
percent of low-income countries do.  DI is widespread in Europe and Latin America, but 
less common in the Middle East (29 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (11 percent). 
Figures 3 and 4 display trends in the adoption of DI by size of per-capita income 
and by region, respectively. The frequency of adoption varies markedly across regions 
and per-capita income classes. Except in the low-income category, countries have been 
adopting DI at an increasing rate. Regionally, Europe, Central Asia, and the Latin-
Caribbean region show accelerated adoption activity.  
The database indicates that deposit-insurance design features vary widely across 
countries.  For example, account coverages range from unlimited guarantees to tight 
coverage limits.  Whereas Mexico, Turkey and Japan promise 100 percent coverage,  
                                                 
2 This database updates and extends an earlier database by Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001).  
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Chile, Switzerland, and the U.K. limit individual-depositor reimbursements to amounts 
less than their nation’s per capita GDP.    
Table 3 summarizes how selected design features vary across different income 
groups and regions.  Besides setting a maximum level of guarantees, countries limit their 
coverages in several other ways. First, some countries insist that accountholders 
"coinsure" a proportion of their balances. However, coinsurance provisions remain 
relatively rare and are particularly infrequent in low-income countries. Second, countries 
do not always cover deposits denominated in foreign currency. Finally, although most 
schemes exclude interbank deposits, a disproportionally large number of countries in the 
low-to-middle income categories choose to guarantee such deposits.   
Deposit-insurance obligations are funded in diverse ways. Most are advance-
funded, commonly from a blend of government and bank sources.  To enable managers to 
build and maintain a dedicated fund of reserves against loss exposures, insurers usually 
assess client banks an annual user charge. Premiums are typically based on the amount of 
insured deposits, but efforts to tie premiums to individual-bank risk exposures have 
gained momentum in recent years. Risk-rating is a difficult task. Assessing risk requires a 
sophisticated staff and access to reliable balance-sheet information from client banks. 
Difficulties in meeting staff and informational requirements help to explain why flat-rate 
systems predominate among low-income adopters.   
Insurance schemes are typically managed by a government agency or by a public-
private partnership.  Only a few countries (such as Argentina, Germany, and Switzerland) 
manage their schemes privately.  Finally, in many countries, membership is compulsory 
for chartered banks.  Here, too, Switzerland is a notable exception.  
  6
When countries are grouped by regions, similarities emerge.  Compulsory 
membership is less common in Asia and the Pacific, and management is almost always 
official. Sub-Saharan African countries cover interbank deposits much more frequently 
than other countries. 
Precisely because combinations of design features are so diverse, the value of the 
database lies in allowing investigators to compare and contrast the ways in which 
different features work in different environments. Section 3 summarizes what 
econometric analysis of this database can tell us about how individual features work in 
various circumstances. 
 
3.  Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence 
An extensive body of economic theory analyzes the benefits and costs of deposit 
insurance and explores how balancing these benefits and costs can produce an optimal 
deposit-insurance system.  Foundational studies include Merton (1978), Buser et al. 
(1981), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Kane (1995), 
Calomiris (1996), Bhattacharya et al. (1998), and Allen and Gale (1998).  Starting from 
the premise that the main benefit of deposit insurance is to prevent wasteful (i.e., value-
destroying) liquidations of bank assets caused by deposit runs, the theoretical debate 
centers on the question of how effectively hypothetical variations in deposit-insurance 
arrangements can curtail voluntary risk taking (i.e., moral hazard).  
Empirical evidence on the operation and design of real-world deposit-insurance 
systems is relatively scarce and limited in geographic coverage.  An adequate body of 
cross-country econometric research is just emerging.  Empirical research addresses five  
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questions about the design and effectiveness of individual-country deposit-insurance 
systems and about the circumstances that might lead a country to establish an explicit 
scheme.  These questions are: 
•  How does deposit insurance affect bank stability? 
•  How does deposit insurance affect market discipline? 
•  How does deposit insurance impact financial development? 
•  What role does deposit insurance play in managing crises? 
•  What factors and circumstances influence deposit-insurance adoption and design? 
The answer to the first four questions is “It depends.” Chief among the items on which 
outcomes depend are the factors and circumstances that influence DI adoption and design 
decisions.  
 
Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises.  Economic theory indicates that, 
depending on how it is designed and managed, deposit insurance can either increase or 
decrease banking stability.  On the one hand, credible deposit insurance can enhance 
financial stability by making depositor runs less likely.  On the other hand, if insured 
institutions' capital positions and risk-taking are not supervised carefully, the insurer 
tends to accrue loss exposures that undermine bank stability in the long run.  Economists 
label insurance-induced risk-taking as “moral hazard.”  Moral hazard occurs because 
sheltering risk-takers from the negative consequences of their behavior increases their 
appetite for risk.  The importance of controlling moral hazard in banking has been stressed 
by academics, but disparaged by many policymakers.  
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) are the first to use a cross-county 
database to study the link between deposit insurance and financial crises.  Their model of 
banking crisis uses 1980-1997 data from 61 countries.  After controlling for numerous 
other determinants, they find that weaknesses in deposit-insurance design increase the 
likelihood that a country will experience a banking crisis. More precisely, deposit 
insurance significantly reduces banking stability in countries whose contracting 
environment is poorly developed, but in stronger environments deposit-insurance 
schemes have little significant effect on stability. Sensitivity tests indicate that this 
finding is not driven by reverse causality.
3  Investigation of individual design features 
shows that deposit insurance proves troublesome in countries where coverage is 
extensive, where authorities amass a large fund of explicit reserves and earmark it for 
insolvency resolution, and where the scheme is managed by government officials rather 
than administered in the private sector.  
An over-riding theme that emerges from research on financial crises concerns the 
adverse influence defects in bank transparency and in mechanisms for enforcing 
counterparty obligations exert on the quality of a country’s regulatory regime.  A large 
and growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that the more effectively the 
private and public contracting environment serves to control incentive conflict, the more 
readily prudential regulation and supervision can rein in the moral-hazard incentives that 
deposit insurance might otherwise generate. 
                                                 
3 The experience of countries that introduce deposit insurance as a result of a crisis does not contribute to 
these results; in fact, observations for each country’s crisis period are dropped from the sample. To 
doublecheck this issue, the authors also analyze a two-stage model that first estimates the probability of 
adopting explicit deposit insurance and then inserts this estimated variable into a second-stage crisis 
equation.  The first-stage results indicate that sample countries decide to adopt deposit insurance because 
other countries adopt it as it becomes perceived to be best practice.  In the second stage, the influence of 
deposit-insurance variables becomes even more significant, indicating that allowing for reverse causality 
does not alter the results.  
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Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline. In high-transparency environments, 
depositors discipline banks that engage in excessive risk-taking by demanding higher 
deposit interest rates and/or moving balances to safer institutions. Because and to the 
extent that deposit insurance reduces a depositor’s stake in monitoring and policing bank 
capital and loss exposures, it shifts responsibility for assuring transparency and 
controlling bank risk-taking to the regulatory system.   
Of course, even if a country’s safety net covered all bank balances, depositors 
would remain at risk for the opportunity costs of claiming and reinvesting the amounts 
they are due and also for costs occasioned by delays in receiving deposit-insurance 
disbursements. This means that government guarantees never completely extinguish 
market discipline. Still, stability can be undermined if deposit-insurance managers 
displace more discipline than they are able to exert    
Using a bank-level dataset covering 43 countries over 1990-1997, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2004) study depositor discipline by modelling deposit interest rates. They 
show that explicit insurance does lower a bank’s interest expense and does make interest 
payments less sensitive to individual-bank risk and liquidity.   
It is important to investigate how particular DI design characteristics affect bank 
risk-taking incentives. Statistical research establishes that, although market discipline 
increases with institutional development, particular deposit-insurance design features 
consistently strengthen or weaken market discipline. On the one hand, market discipline 
is enhanced by coinsurance provisions, covering accounts denominated in foreign 
currency, and involving private managers in the insurance enterprise. On the other hand,  
  10
significant amounts of private market discipline is displaced by setting high coverage 
limits; extending coverage to interbank deposits; establishing an ex-ante fund of reserves; 
granting the insurer direct access to government resources; or insisting on public 
management.   
Although deposit insurance displaces some market discipline even in advanced 
countries, the net effect DI has on stability need not be negative. At the margin, stability 
is improved if DI is accompanied by appropriate regulation and supervision.  This 
conclusion further clarifies the link between insurance and banking crises.  
A complementary body of research explores the risk-shifting incentives that one 
can infer from the behavior of estimates of safety-net subsidies imbedded in individual-
bank stock prices (e.g., Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven, 2003).  These studies show that 
countries with poor private and public contracting environments are less apt to design 
their DI system well. This implies countries with weak contracting environments are apt 
to suffer adverse consequences from installing a DI scheme. 
 
Deposit Insurance and Financial Development. Individual countries adopt deposit 
insurance for different reasons.  In developing countries, a common goal is to expand the 
reach of the formal banking system and to increase the flow of bank credit by minimizing 
depositor doubts about the banking system’s ability to redeem depositor claims when 
funds are needed. To the extent that deposit insurance bolsters depositors’ faith in the 
stability of a country’s banking industry, it mobilizes household savings and allows these 
savings to be invested in more efficient ways. A considerable body of research shows that  
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financial development does indeed improve the productivity of real investment and 
sustain higher levels of aggregate economic growth (e.g., Levine, 1997). 
The quality of a nation’s contracting environment limits the contribution that 
variations in regulatory structure can make to economic development and 
macroeconomic growth. Recent adopters of deposit insurance include African and Latin 
American countries with low levels of financial development and government 
accountability.
   Using time-series data for 58 countries, Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) 
find that explicit deposit insurance favorably impacts the level and volatility of financial 
activity only in the presence of strong institutional development. In institutionally weak 
environments, deposit insurance appears to undermine the productivity of real investment 
and retards rather than promotes sustainable financial development. 
  
  Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management.  Crisis management entails a number 
of difficult policy tradeoffs between recovery speed, economic efficiency, and 
distributional fairness. Due to deficiencies in prior disaster planning, it has become 
common practice to issue blanket guarantees to arrest a banking crisis.  Countries 
adopting this strategy include Sweden (1992), Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), Korea 
(1997), Malaysia (1998), and Indonesia (1998).  Turkey tried to halt its financial panic in 
2000 by guaranteeing not just bank depositors, but all domestic and foreign nondeposit 
creditors of Turkish banks.  
Advocates of using blanket guarantees to halt a systemic crisis argue that 
sweeping guarantees can be immediately helpful – if not essential – in stopping a 
spreading flight to quality.  However, because blanket guarantees create an expectation of  
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their future use in similar circumstances, they undermine market discipline and may 
prove greatly destabilizing over longer periods.  Although countries can formally scale 
back explicit DI coverages when a crisis recedes, it is very difficult to eliminate 
conjectural coverages in a credible manner. 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) analyze the impact of blanket guarantees and 
other crisis-management strategies on the full fiscal costs of resolving banking-system 
distress.  Their analysis of 40 separate crises experienced in 1980-1997 indicates that 
unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, and capital forbearance 
significantly increase the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving a banking crisis.  Moreover, the 
data show no trade-off between fiscal costs and the speed of economic recovery.  In their 
sample, depositor guarantees and regulatory forbearance failed to reduce significantly 
either the length of a country’s crisis or the size of the crisis-induced decline in aggregate 
real output the crisis induced. 
Providing liquidity support for economically insolvent institutions appears to 
prolong a crisis. It does this by distorting bank incentives: disposing bank managers to 
favor risky longshot investments over less-risky projects. Bank-level gambles for 
resurrection delay healthy adjustments and tend to generate further declines in aggregate 
output.  
 
Determinants of Deposit Insurance Adoption and Design.  Our review of the 
literature indicates that introducing explicit deposit insurance into weak private and 
public contracting environments tends to undermine market discipline in ways that 
reduce bank stability, destroy real economic capital, and sidetrack economic  
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development. To understand and counter this threat, one must examine the factors that 
dispose a country to adopt deposit insurance and influence its design.  Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Kane and Laeven (2006) investigate this question using 1960-2003 data covering 170 
countries.   
Their goal is to assemble a comprehensive dataset with which to determine 
whether and how outside influences, economic circumstances, crisis pressures, and 
political institutions affect deposit-insurance adoption and design. To study this sample 
robustly, the authors use three complementary regression strategies: limited dependent-
variable regression, hazard analysis, and Heckman selection models. They estimate 
adoption and design decisions simultaneously and control for the influence of: economic 
and political characteristics; disruptive events (such as macroeconomic shocks); 
occurrence and severity of crises; and the nature of the contracting environment. They 
find that outside pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and 
political arrangements that facilitate intersectoral deal-making dispose a country toward 
adopting a DI scheme.  Another strong and robust conclusion is that countries design 
their schemes especially poorly when they install DI in response to a financial crisis.  
 
Summary. Research on the first four questions suggests that, to install DI successfully, 
weaknesses in a country’s contracting environment must be identified so that design 
features can be adapted to them. Decisions to install DI during and after a crisis must not 
proceed hastily. Policymakers must make a concerted effort to appreciate that pre-
existing weaknesses in transparency, government accountability, and private contract 
enforcement limit the kinds of reforms they may advantageously pursue.   
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4.   Lessons from Country Experiences 
This section reviews a few instructive examples of good and bad experience with 
deposit insurance. The United States was the first country to establish nationwide deposit 
insurance. It did so in 1934 in response to the Great Depression. Kroszner (2006) reviews 
U.S. experience. Initially, the coverage limit was set at $2,500, but rose quickly to 
$5,000. The limit has been increased many times since then: to $10,000 in 1950, $15,000 
in 1966, $20,000 in 1969, $40,000 in 1974, and to $100,000 in 1980. Legislation 
expected to pass in February 2006 indexes coverage limits for inflation and extends 
coverage for retirement accounts to $250,000.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2006) show that outside influences and crisis 
pressures are major determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design. Many 
countries installed DI countries during times of banking crisis. To stop bank runs quickly 
and to forestall civil unrest, organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank often 
advise the prompt introduction of sweeping government guarantees of bank deposits.  
During financial crises, response speed is important, but authorities must not 
allow it to become the only consideration. Guaranteeing the liabilities of deeply insolvent 
banks is invariably a mistake. This is because insolvent banks have strong incentives to 
book risk exposures that abuse government guarantees. Even though broad coverages -- 
including blanket guarantees -- can stem bank runs, they adversely constrain a nation’s 
future policy options (Kane and Klingebiel, 2004). After issuing broad guarantees, 
countries typically find themselves forced to support sweeping coverages for many years 
after the crisis has receded. When guarantees are issued abruptly without prior planning  
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(as in Turkey in 2000), it becomes particularly difficult to scale back the guarantees when 
the emergency ends. After its 1986 banking crisis, Mexico covered deposit balances in 
full for more than a decade. 
  Apart from crises, efforts to integrate national financial markets exert strong 
extraterritorial influence on deposit-insurance design. The EU Directive on Deposit 
Insurance dictates that each member state insure individual accounts up to at least 20,000 
euros. In low-income countries, this minimum has generated inefficiently high coverage. 
Dimitrova and Nenovsky (2006) show that efforts by EU accession countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe to comply with the EU Directive produced deposit-insurance 
coverages that are inordinately high relative both to bank capital and to GDP per capita. 
Dimitrova and Nenovsky argue that the overinsurance in accession countries has 
increased moral hazard by distorting the incentives of their poorly capitalized domestic 
banks. Huizinga (2006) emphasizes that, although overinsurance is visible in several new 
member states, for nations in the higher-income EU-15 area, the coverage minimum 
poses no difficulty. 
  Financial integration led six Francophone African countries that had previously 
established a common central bank to plan for deposit insurance: Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo. Together, 
these countries form the Communité Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale 
(CEMAC), an organization that plans to install explicit deposit insurance in all six 
member countries. As in the EU case, large differences in the level of GDP per capita 
exist across member states and these differences make it difficult to negotiate a common 
level of deposit insurance coverage for all member states. The result is that, although  
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proposed in 1999, so far the DI plan has only been ratified by 2 of the 6 CEMAC 
countries. 
Although it is unusual for a country to revoke explicit deposit insurance once it is 
in place, a few exceptional cases exist. Argentina provides a recent example. Before 
1979, deposits in Argentina were unconditionally guaranteed by the Argentinean 
government. In 1979, a deposit-insurance scheme was installed by the military 
government. The scheme provided full coverage for an accountholder’s first million 
pesos (about $640) and ninety percent coninsurance thereafter. In 1991, this scheme was 
abolished and replaced by a system that intensified the supervision of Argentine banks. 
However, after supervisors suspended the operations of five private banks in April 1995, 
deposit insurance was re-introduced. Current accounts, savings accounts and time 
deposits are now covered up to $30,000.  
Mexico provides another interesting example. Haber (2006) reviews Mexico’s 
experience with deposit insurance over the last 120 years. During the period 1884-1982, 
Mexico did not have explicit deposit insurance. Potentially imprudent behavior by 
insiders was mitigated by arrangements that served simultaneously to promote good 
corporate governance and to limit competition by controlling the entry of new banks. The 
resulting banking system proved stable and profitable, but attracted extremely low levels 
of deposits. Supplemental activity by government development banks generated a large 
number of inefficient public-sector enterprises. During the period 1991-2004, Mexico 
introduced deposit insurance, but because the scheme countenanced minimal bank 
regulation and weak corporate governance, it led to reckless lending, high borrower 
default rates, and a taxpayer-financed bailout of various bank stockholders.  
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Among more-recent adopters, Russia has received considerable attention. Russia 
is a large country that has experienced financial crisis and taken nearly 10 years to 
finalize its decision to introduce deposit insurance. Honohan and Montes-Negret (2006) 
reviews Russian experience with deposit-insurance planning. Partly because of poor 
licensing policies, during Russia’s post-Soviet transition, authorities had to cope with a 
number of very weak banks. Many institutions were severely underdiversified, having 
had to limit their lending activity to enterprises operating within an assigned business 
group.  
Russia suffered a major banking crisis in 1998. A unilateral restructuring of 
government debt resulted in depositor runs and a collapse of the payments system. In the 
absence of formal deposit insurance, officials rescued many households by transferring 
their deposits from privately owned banks to the government-owned Sberbank. The 
collapse of several private banks and the resulting expansion of loanable funds allowed 
Sberbank to transform itself from a savings bank to a universal bank. Sberbank now 
holds a 75 percent share of the country’s retail deposits and roughly 25 percent of 
banking assets overall.  
In the wake of these events, government-sponsored deposit insurance was seen as 
a way both to increase trust in the payments system and to create a level playing field 
between the state-owned Sberbank and the private banks. Legislation providing for a 
system of deposit insurance was adopted at the end of December 2003. 
In this instance, because the regulatory and supervisory framework of Russia was 
seen as weak, the international community cautioned against DI adoption. Possibilities 
and incentives for depositors to exert market discipline on banks were limited and had  
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been further undermined by the government’s willingness to protect well-connected bank 
owners from the consequences of the 1998 crisis. Incentives for additional risk-taking 
established by deposit insurance could easily increase financial fragility and slow 
financial and economic development. It seemed wiser to consolidate and restructure the 
banking sector and establish a competitive balance between Sberbank and the private 
banks before deposit insurance was implemented. In this way, authorities could build 
trust by enforcing bank rules and regulations effectively, by de-licensing fragile banks, 
and by allowing only sound and relatively transparent financial institutions to operate. 
This would give private creditors and investors the ability to monitor banks and an 
incentive to exert market discipline. 
However, the Russian government chose a different path. It put deposit insurance 
into effect in early 2004. In the hopes of mitigating moral hazard, the new scheme 
covered only balances in household accounts up to Rb 100,000 (around $US 3,400). This 
limit was roughly the same as the country’s per capita GDP. Excluding corporate deposits 
from the scheme lessened the participation of banks that were connected to business 
groups. Membership in the scheme required approval from the Central Bank of Russia so 
that distressed banks could in principle be excluded from the scheme. A special state 
guarantee on deposits in the state-owned Sberbank was scheduled to be phased out by Jan 
2007.
4  
Many countries have considered and rejected explicit deposit insurance. Namibia 
is a case in point. Spurred by neighboring South Africa’s debate on whether or not to 
adopt deposit insurance, the Central Bank of Namibia formally investigated the 
                                                 
4 Sberbank’s DI premia are maintained in a separate account until its share of household deposits falls 
below 50% or until 1 Jan 2007, whichever comes first. The funds accumulated in this account may only be 
used for pay-outs on Sberbank deposits.  
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desirability and feasibility of installing deposit insurance in Namibia. The Namibian 
banking system is dominated by a few South African banks. The study concluded that 
domestic banks were too small and too few to warrant an insurance scheme.  
Other countries, such as Malaysia, have made a conscious decision to restructure 
their financial system before undertaking a deposit-insurance program. For many years, 
China has been studying the wisdom of DI adoption. Although burdened by a large 
proportion of nonperforming loans, the Chinese have developed one of the deepest 
banking systems in the world and done so without introducing deposit insurance or other 
kinds of formal guarantees. Chinese authorities are now proposing a deposit-insurance 
scheme which would combine a high threshold for complete coverage of individual 
accounts with a low co-insurance rate for balances that exceed the ceiling. Honohan and 
Montes-Negret (2006) examines some of the benefits and costs of this proposal. The 
potential benefit is that, by relieving pressure on the Chinese central bank to rescue 
insolvent banks, a well-designed scheme could improve regulatory incentives. However, 
without a prior restructuring to definitely assign the losses imbedded in state banks, 
deposit insurance is likely – rather than to correct bank and regulator incentives – to 
introduce further distortions.  
 
5.  Principles of Good Design 
Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm that, 
for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the installation 
of a deposit-insurance system.  Explicit insurance can help to develop a robust financial 
system. But it does so only when it is carefully designed and introduced into a country  
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whose public and private contracting environment includes reliable institutions of loss 
control.  The difficulty is one of sequencing.  Where financial controls are poor, explicit 
deposit insurance can spur financial development only in the very short run.  Although 
formal guarantees make banks more eager to lend, they also undermine longstanding 
patterns of bank bonding and depositor discipline. Over longer periods, the displacement of 
pre-existing private discipline can encourage patterns of lending that increase financial 
fragility and deter financial development. In this case, excessive risk-taking leads to 
financial and nonfinancial insolvencies that destroy real economic capital.  
The downside of installing explicit insurance is that it reduces incentives for 
depositors to monitor the riskiness of their banks. Depositors are prepared to tolerate 
aggressive bank lending whenever they believe that, even if borrowers cannot repay the 
bank, their deposit claims will be paid by the deposit insurer.  Unless the insurer can 
effectively replace the (private) monitoring that government guarantees displace, aggressive 
banks can fund a portfolio of risky loans at a deposit interest rate that lies far below the yield 
at which the resulting exposure to loss deserves to be funded.  In institutionally weak 
environments, effective deposit-insurance design is often blocked by political obstacles that 
end up intensifying rather than reducing the probability and depth of future crises.  
  For countries that have already installed or are in the process of designing an explicit 
deposit-insurance scheme, cross-country empirical research identifies six common-sense 
principles of good design.  No government can afford to neglect these principles.  Even in 
the strong institutional environments, weaknesses in deposit-insurance design and 
distortionary political pressures that support them can fuel financial fragility and lessen the  
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discipline that banks receive from private counterparties.  To control and offset these effects, 
six design features have proved themselves useful.  
  The most straightforward principle entails setting enforceable coverage limits. 
Insurers’ first priority must be to assure that official supervision complements private 
monitoring. To accomplish this, the scheme must be designed and managed in ways that 
convince large depositors, subordinated debtholders, and correspondent banks that their 
funds are truly and inescapably at risk.  Maintaining strong incentives for private parties to 
bond and police bank risk exposures is especially important in contracting environments 
where accounting transparency and government accountability are deficient.  
A second principle is to make membership in the deposit-insurance system 
compulsory.  This increases the size of the insurance pool and prevents strong institutions 
from selecting out of the pool whenever the fund needs an injection of new capital.    
A third principle supported by cross-country evidence is to make the public and 
private sectors jointly responsible for overseeing the scheme.  A public-private partnership 
establishes checks and balances that improve management performance.  
The fourth principle is to limit the fund’s ability to shift losses and loss exposures to 
the general taxpayer.  Whether or not the insurer holds a formal fund of reserves, it must be 
crystal clear that except, in truly catastrophic circumstances, funds to cover bank losses will 
come principally from the pool of surviving banks.  Access to taxpayer assistance should be 
legally impeded by statutory provisions that can be relaxed only in extraordinary 
circumstances and by following extraordinary procedures.  
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The fifth principle is to price deposit-insurance services appropriately. Laeven 
(2006) shows that countries have typically underpriced deposit insurance. He describes 
several methods for pricing deposit insurance accurately. 
The sixth and final principle is that deposit insurers must actively involve 
themselves in decisions about when and how to resolve individual-bank insolvencies. 
Because deposit insurers are responsible for paying off insured depositors, they have a 
strong interest in assuring the prompt and speedy resolution of insolvent banks. Beck and 
Laeven (2006) argue that deposit insurers are more efficient than courts because banking 
supervisors better understand bank risk-taking incentives and how to remedy them. Using 
data for over large number of banks in over 50 countries, they show that banks are more 
stable and less likely to become insolvent in countries where the deposit insurer has the 
responsibility of intervening failed banks and the power to revoke membership in the 
deposit insurance scheme. 
  Deposit insurance is strong medicine.  Whether it benefits or harms a country 
depends on how well it is designed and administered. It can be a useful part of a country's 
overall system of bank regulation and financial markets, but cross-country research stresses 
the importance of promptly identifying and eliminating individual-bank insolvencies, 
fostering informative accounting standards, and establishing reliable procedures for contract 
enforcement before adopting explicit deposit insurance. Research also underscores the need 
to build in a capacity to adapt to financial changes. Managers must be empowered and 
incentivized to upgrade their loss controls to disable unforseeable loopholes that regulator-
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Figure 1: The rise of deposit insurance around the world, 1935-2003. 
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Figure 4. Trends in the adoption of explicit deposit insurance by region*  
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Table 1.  Recent Establishment of Deposit Insurance Schemes 










Nicaragua, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia 
2000 
 
Cyprus, Jordan, Vietnam 
1999 
 
Bahamas, Ecuador*, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Kazakstan  
(Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Republic of Congo: deposit insurance law ratified by 2 out of these 6 
CEMAC countries) 
 
1998  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, Gibraltar, Indonesia*, Jamaica, Latvia, 
Malaysia*, Ukraine 
 
1997 Algeria,  Croatia,  Thailand* 
 
1996  Belarus, Korea, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden 
 
1995  Brazil, Bulgaria, Oman, Poland 




Table 2. Proportion of countries with explicit deposit insurance to total by category 




   Proportion based on 
Category  Number of countries   GDP  GDP per capita 
By income level      
High income  75.00 96.35 83.45 
Upper middle income  60.71 86.20 63.26 
Lower middle income  58.82 57.56 64.25 
Low income  16.39 78.11 17.26 
      
By geographical region*      
Asia & Pacific  38.46 48.76 53.78 
Europe & Central Asia  74.07 97.24 93.40 
Latin America & Caribbean  66.67 98.34 71.11 
Middle East & North Africa  28.57 16.36 42.84 
Sub-Saharan Africa  10.87 17.12 3.63 
*Regional breakdown excludes high income countries    
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Table 3.  Design features of explicit deposit insurance schemes 
Proportion of countries with each feature in a given category (as of 2003, in percent) 
 
By level of income       




income  Low income    
Proportion in 
all countries
Foreign currency deposits covered  73  80  82  57    76 
Inter-bank deposits covered  7  7  29  43    18 
Co-insurance exists  27  44  21  0    25 
Payment per depositor  77  94  72  78    79 
Scheme is permanently funded  63  94  97  100    84 
Premiums are risk-adjusted  20  19  39  0    25 
Membership is compulsory  93  100  82  100    91 
Source of funding             
Private 50  7  42  14    36 
Joint 50  87  58  86    63 
Public 0  7  0  0    1 
Administration            
Official 47  63  70  75    60 
Joint 30  31  26  13    27 
Private 23  6  4  13      12 
 






Latin America & 
Caribbean 




Foreign currency deposits covered  71  100  75  25  40 
Inter-bank deposits covered  57  5  19  25  75 
Co-insurance exists  0  45  18  25  0 
Payment per depositor  75  80  82  75  80 
Scheme is permanently funded  86  100  94  100  100 
Premiums are risk-adjusted  33  35  29  0  0 
Membership is compulsory  50  95  94  100  100 
Source of funding           
Private 33  26  33  25  0 
Joint 67  74  60  75  100 
Public 0  0  7  0  0 
Administration          
Official 100  63  71  50  60 
Joint 0  37  18  50  20 
Private 0  0  12  0  20 
*Regional breakdown excludes high income countries      
 
 
 